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A SURVEY OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN COMBATING
RECIPROCAL TRADING UNDER EXISTING
TRADE REGULATION LAWS
ARTHUR DONALD AUSTINt
To what extent, if at all, the practice of reciprocal buying is in
harmony with the trade regulation laws is one of the more perplexing
conundrums that presently confronts those firms participating in the
activities of today's commercial world. The recently decided Federal
Trade CoinmissioL v. Consolidated Foods Corp.' case has certainly
furnished fresh insights into the problem. That deci 3ion also illuminated
some of the unknowns and complexities that must be resolved before a
workable legal interpretation can be placed upon this practice. A major
obstacle to analysis is the absence of official commentary by company
executives on reciprocal trading.' The paucity of decisions on the sub-
ject further increases the difficulties. Hence the compatibility of recip-
rocal trading with the scope of the antitrust laws is still very much open
to question.
Reciprocal trading is defined, in oversimplified terms, as the prac-
tice of making purchases that are expressly or tacitly conditioned upon
f Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Bowling Green State Univ,
member Virginia Bar.
1. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
2. On the other hand, commentary from outside sources has been increasing. See,
e.g., Dean & Handler, Crackdown on Reciprocity, Joint Ventures Forseen, Steel, Mar.
18, 1963, p. 27; Latest Target: Doing Business With Your Friends, Nations Bus., Jan.
1965, p. 37; Reilly, U.S. Sights on Reciprocity: Antitrust Official Vows Hostility to
Backscratching Supply Deals, Chem. Week, Feb. 27, 1965, p. 12; Ammer, Realistic
Reciprocity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1962, p. 116; Asper, Reciprocity, Purchasing
Power and Competition, 48 MIN. L. REv. 523 (1964); Donnen, The Conglomerate
Merger and Reciprocity, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 283 (1963); K1ale & Hale, Reciprocity
Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L. R'.v. 69 (1964); Handler,
Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L.
REv. 433 (1963) ; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitru.'t Laws, 77 HAnv. L. REv.
873 (1964) ; Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under §7 of 'he Clayton Act, 9 ANTI-
TRUST BU.L. 93 (1964) ; Phillips, Reciprocity Under the Anti 'rust Laws: Observations
on the Hales' Comment, 113 U. PA. L. R:v. 77 (1964); Stocking & Mueller, Business
Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. CHI. 73 (1957); Note, Reciprocity-
Antitrust Violation by Natural Reaction, 32 GEo. WAsH L. 1PT.v. 832 (1964).
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the vendee making a complimentary purchase. "The essence of the
arrangement is the willingness of each company to buy from the other,
conditioned upon the expectation that the other company will make
reciprocal purchases."'  The theory underlying the practice is not of
recent origin. Adam Smith complained that the "sneaking arts of
tradesmen . . .who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own custom-
ers"4 should not be enlarged into a foreign trade policy. Today's cor-
porate representatives, when they reluctantly discuss the ramifications of
reciprocity, complain about the inherent disadvantages of basing the
sales future of their organization upon the pressures that can be generated
through the purchasing department. Reciprocity has been accused of
being a "negation of scientific considerations which would normally in-
dicate the selection of the most favorable supplier,"' as being "inconsistent
with . . . the free enterprise ethic"' and as a creator of "false markets."7
However, condemnatory language does not preclude a solid commitment
by many enterprises to the use of this technique. Its success as a means
of building sales seems to outweigh all other factors. That studies in-
dicate-almost all firms are, in some fashion, susceptible to the pressures
of reciprocal buying is not surprising.' Moreover, changes in the struc-
ture of the economy that encourage its continued use and favor its growth
have made recourse to reciprocity even more attractive.
Most firms that generate sales through purchases do so with a great
degree of circumspection. This is true regardless of the depth of their
commitment to reciprocity.' Excellent reasons justify this attitude.
3. EDWARDS, CONGLOMERATE BIGNESS AS A SouRcE OF PowER, BUSINESS CONCEN-
TRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331, 342 (1955).
4. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 460 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
5. HEiamTz, PURCHASING 559 (1947).
6. Ammer, supra note 2, at 121.
7. Reciprocity-Dangerous Selling Tool Winning 'New Users,, Sales Mgt., May 20,
1960, pp. 40, 42.
8. As far back as 1938 a study revealed "that to a greater or less degree
reciprocity is found in nearly every type of manufacturing business as well as in banking
institutions and insurance, public utility, transportation and construction companies."
Lewis, The Present Statis of Reciprocity as a Sales Policy, Harv. Bus. Rev., Spring,
1938, p. 299. A more comprehensive study in 1961 indicated that the situation had not
changed. "100% of the P. A.'s surveyed report that reciprocity is a major factor in
buyer-seller relations in the chemical, petroleum, iron and steel, and other basic raw
material industries. In addition, the majority of the buyers in these industries report
an increase in the number and extent of reciprocity problems." Sloan, Reciprocity:
Where does the P. A. Stand?, Purchasing, Nov. 20, 1961, pp. 70, 71.
9. In the course of an inquiry into the reciprocal buying habits of railroad carriers
the Interstate Commerce Commission noted that "Notwithstanding extended examina-
tion of witnesses with the carriers' records as a basis, little information was elicited
other than that contained in the documents. The result is that we were hanicapped in
developing the facts because of the difficulty in obtaining information as to private
conversations and oral agreements as to purchases and traffic." Reciprocity i; Pur-
chasing and Routing, 188 I.C.C. 417, 433 (1932).
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There are no well-defined guidelines within which it can, with legal
impunity, be utilized. Few cases"0 have dealt specifically with recipro-
city. There are no statutes that prohibit it specifically or deal precisely
with it. There is little, if any, mention of reciprocity in the legislative
history of the various antitrust and trade regulation acts. It is the
purpose of this paper to endeavor to erase some of the uncertainty sur-
rounding reciprocal trading by examining it within the context of existing
legislation. Such an investigation necessarily involves a statement of
definitions, a brief review of those legally relevant economic circumstances
that foster reciprocity, and a scrutiny of the few occasions courts have
considered the problem.
I. DEFINITIONS
Everything Being Equal Reciprocity
Where the quality, service, and price of supplies are equal it is
obviously sound business to purchase from those companies which are
present or potential customers. Such a practice aids effectively in cul-
tivating an acceptable type of good will that can ultimately lead to in-
creased sales. This is a manifestation of reciprocity, if it can be labeled
such, in its most innocuous form. As long as bu3ing from customer-
suppliers is practiced on this informal basis and as long as price, quality
and service retain their customary importance, reciprocity has no legal
significance.
Complete Reciprocity
When a company consciously arranges its purchasing program
towards the objective of generating sales there is a total commitment to
reciprocal trading. Normal purchasing criteria beccme secondary to the
major objective of channeling purchasing pressure towards customer-
suppliers. Regardless of price, quality or service, s appliers are expected
to reciprocate purchases. Simply stated, buying is used as a deliberate
and continuing sales instrument. This involves a concerted effort on the
part of the company. Most firms which practice reciprocal buying on
this level coordinate all purchasing and selling activities into a single unit
that is commonly known as the Trade Relations Department. 1 The
10. Federal Trade Com. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; United
States v. Ingersall-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963); United States v. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1518 (S.D.N.Y. April 9,
1965); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REI. (1965 Trade Cas.)
71457 (D.N.J. April 6, 1965); California Packing Corp. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937);
MHechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
11. For thorough discussions of the Trade Relations Department concept see
Sloan, supra note 8, at 73; Meade, The Trade Relations Function in Modern Btsiness,
American Management Ass'n, Management Bull. No. 19: Trade Relations Defined
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primary purpose of this department is to "keep records of all company
buying; forward information on suppliers to sales chiefs . . . coordinate
purchasing to create as many big volume orders as possible . . . and
make sure that all reciprocal trade is carried on quietly and without
notice."' 2
Complete reciprocity means that persuasion of various shades and
nuances is used on a firm's suppliers as a means of prompting return
sales. " This persuasion may take the form of the purchasing agent
accompanying sales personnel on visits to big accounts, it may be reflected
by articulated threats to withdraw purchases, 4 or it may consist of a
transcending awareness by the concerned parties of the firm's gigantic
reservoir of purchasing power and the willingness, if the need arises, to
use this power. 5 Purchasing power has been expressly recognized as a
force that can easily induce reciprocal purchases.
It is not overly speculative to assume that the judicious
use of its steel-purchasing power by Ingersoll-Rand could im-
measurably increase the sales by the acquired companies of
machinery and equipment to the coal mining companies which
acutely need the continued good will of the steel industry.
Moreover, the mere existence of this purchasing power might
make its conscious employment toward this end unnecessary;
the possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophis-
ticated businessmen are quick to see the advantages in securing
the good will of the possessor."
Multilateral Reciprocity
Reciprocity does not always appear in the form of a simple and
direct sales relationship between two firms. Quite often there is a tri-
angular trading connection between companies that results in what is
commonly known as multilateral reciprocity. Firm A uses the buying
strength that it has with its supplier, Firm B, to convince the latter to
persuade one of its suppliers, Firm C, to make its purchases from Firm A.
For example, a large manufacturer that specializes in underground mining
machinery, a product that requires a heavy steel quota, might be able to
1 (1962). For a description of such a department in action see U.S. v. General Dynamics,
5 TRADE REG. REP (1965 Trade Cas.) ff 71518 at 81280-1 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1965).
12. Reciprocity-Dangerous Selling Tool Winning New Users, supra note 7, at 41.
13. Sometimes the use of reciprocity pressure will cause the customer-supplier to
adopt the same policy in return. Reciprocity in Purchasing and Routing, supra note 9, at
423.
14. California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16
F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
15. United States v. Ingersall-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
16. Id. at 524.
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persuade its steel suppliers to prevail upon the latter's coal suppliers to
purchase mining machinery." It should be noted that reciprocal trading
is not necessarily restricted to direct or multilateral practice-a labyrinth
of relationships can conceivably be developed. However, the uncertainty
of effective control in anything beyond multilateral reciprocity precludes
efficacious use.
Reciprocity Through Asset and Stock Acquisition
Reciprocity has not yet crystallized into a stereotyped market mane-
uver. Thus, a dominant firm need not necessarily engage in reciprocal
trading to increase its sales. Often purchasing power is used to improve
the sales posture of a smaller firm in which the dominant firm has a
vested interest. The term "vested interest" can b defined as control
through asset acquisition or influence through the purchase of stock.
Reciprocity through asset acquisition is reflected in the Consolidated
Foods case. Consolidated Foods was a manufacturer and wholesaler of
food products which, in the normal course of business, made substantial
purchases from food processors. It acquired the assets of a firm which
happened to be a potential supplier of the food proce3sors. It was alleged
that through the application of pressure by Consolidated Foods upon
their suppliers the overall market position of the acquired firm was im-
proved.' In other words, it was suggested that Consolidated Foods
would buy its supplies only from those suppliers who purchased goods
from the acquired company.
Stock acquisition in a company operating in a totally unrelated
market can provide a type of situation that invites the use of reciprocity.
A position of authority in the acquiring firm, resulting either from stock
control or management command, is used to improve the sales position of
the other company and thus enhance the value of the newly purchased
stock. Just as in the asset acquisition situation the acquiring firm per-
suades its suppliers that it would be advantageous to purchase from the
company in which the stock investment has been made. For example,
three Armour and Company executives purchased a sizeable block of
shares in the Waugh Equipment Company, a firm that manufactured
draft gears for railroads. Since the railroads wcre large suppliers of
transportation to Armour they were particularly receptive to the sugges-
tion that gear purchases be made from Waugh. As a result of this
suasion Waugh's sales increased "from a place of obscurity,"'" or sales
of "1o of the total draft gears . . . in 1924 '121 to 35 percent of the
17. United States v. Ingersall-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
18. 380 U.S. at 593.
19. Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232, 242 (1931).
20. Ibid.
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market in 1930.
For purposes of definition it is assumed that the acquiring firm is
in such a position that it can effectively persuade its suppliers to deal with
the acquired firm (or the firm in which the stock investment is made).
It is likewise assumed that the suppliers are capable of exerting influence
in the acquired firm's market. The texture of these relationships is of
course crucial and will be examined in subsequent paragraphs.
II. THE EcoNOimIc ENVIRONMENT OF RECIPROCITY
Before it can be determined satisfactorily whether reciprocity is
significant enough to merit sustained court and legislative attention an
inquiry must be made into the circumstances and factors that engender
its use. What type of economic environment is favorable to the use and
growth of reciprocity and why is it so attractive to the modem firm?
Since complete reciprocity, as defined in this paper, has not attracted a
great deal of attention until relatively recently, the answer to these ques-
tions can best be found through a condensed survey of some of the
contemporary cross currents in the economy.
First, oligopoly2' now dominates22 most industries. Essentially
ologopoly means that "A few large sellers account collectively for the
whole or major part of production and sales"23 in a given industry. One
of the effects of oligopoly is that the products marketed by the few
manufacturers have similar, or at least substitutable, characteristics.
Because of this and the fact that a lowering of prices invites swift com-
petitor reaction,24 it is difficult for a firm to increase its share of the
market. However, it can be done by resorting to methods other than
price competition.25  Reciprocal trading is such a method. Its principal
attraction to the oligopolist rests in the automatic relegation of price to a
21. See generally CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1948); FELL-ER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949).
22. SEE WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FIRMS 32-44
(1953).
23. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, ANTITRUST IN AN EXPANDING
ECONOMY 10 (1962).
24. "It is conceivable that the oligopolist might initiate a price reduction on the
assumption that rivals will leave their prices unchanged. It will soon discover . . . that
this assumption is not valid. If its price reduction is successful & results in shifting a
significant volume of sales from rival firms, these firms will take steps to check their
loss of sales. These countermoves by the rival firms will in most cases involve price
reductions on their products. . . . In some cases, a series of price reductions might
be set in motion, resulting in extreme price instability & a price war." CARTER & SNAVELY,
INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 219 (1961).
25. A firm often attempts, through various techniques, to distinguish its products
from those of competitors. This is commonly known as "product differentiation." See
BAIN, BARRIERs To NEW COMPETITIoN 114 (1956). For a brief discussion of the impact
of product differentiation on competition see REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 330-31 (1955).
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non-influencing consideration. In other words, it is unnecessary to dis-
turb price levels. Hence, sales can be increased without awakening the
retaliatory propensities of competitors.
Second, one of the characteristics of today's economy is a movement
towards extension and diversification28 into new and unrelated product
lines-an objective that is accomplished through conglomerate mergers.
Firms no longer depend upon a single market. By spreading interests
over several markets a company can hedge against the failure of a single
product. However, to maintain and support diversification obviously
requires a substantial increase in the quantity of purchases. As the need
to explore and utilize heretofore untapped sources of supply increases,
the opportunities to engage in complete reciprocity are correspondingly
multiplied." In fact, diversification might afford a conscious and de-
liberate means of dilating a firm's existing reciprocal trading power.
Third, the occurrence of the severe depression of the '30's and the
periodic appearances of subsequent recessions has made reciprocity at-
tractive to many firms which otherwise might never have used it.2" Any
qualms as to the ethical and legal propriety of the practice were, and
perhaps still are, considered secondary to the primary goal of keeping
the company in business. One commentator describes the situation as
follows:
Whatever the implications involved in this controversy
may be, it does appear . . not only that the sales volumes
sought on this basis (reciprocity) in the middle and late '30's
was substantially larger than in 1929, but that it was growing
steadily. There were several reasons for this increased popu-
larity (of reciprocity), among which may b2 mentioned the
effort to maintain sales volume during a depression . . . and
the belief that under competitive conditions a3 they prevail in
some lines of business, many companies must resort to recip-
rocity in order to survive."
26. See, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA-
TION AND PRoDucT DIVERSIFICATION IN THE 1,000 LARGEST MANUFACTURING COMsPANIES:
1950.
27. "A firm that makes many products can more readily find a supplier that is
also a potential buyer of what it makes. And, if it is a largt purchaser, it may readily
persuade its supplier to buy from it. . . . A diversified firm may use its purchases in
making one product to push its sales of others; and if, as is nat infrequent, a diversified
firm has a near-monopoly of some product (in the sale of which it need not resort to
reciprocal buying), it can use its purchases of raw materials for this product to increase
it[s] sales of products encountering more nearly competitivc markets." Stocking and
Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firens, 30 J. Bus. U. Chi. 73, 77 (1957).
28. Id. at 296; HEiNRITz, op. cit. supra note 5, at 554-55.
29. LEwis, PROCUREMENT: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 415 (1949).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Economic Effects of Reciprocal Trading
There is little empirical data (particularly of a statistical nature)
available upon which to base definite conclusions about the ultimate
economic effects of reciprocal trading. The judicial decisions that de-
vote attention in depth to the practice deal mainly with the more immedi-
ate problem of legality. These cases will be discussed in detail later.
In order to place proper perspective on these cases it is necessary to sum-
marize some of the more pronounced economic implications of reciprocity.
Reciprocity disturbs the normal competitive equilibrium of those
industries in which it is prevalent. The more traditional competitive
components, such as price, quality, and service, lose part of their natural
importance as marketplace levers. Sudden shifts in the market standings
that cannot be attributed to normal causes occur. Monopoly can evolve
in an affected industry. Entry into a new market, already difficult,"0
may become impossible to a company that is unable to make reciprocal
buying arrangements. Likewise, successful reciprocal trading automatic-
ally forecloses the market to the practitioner's competitors. Edwards
points out that "Between two powerful concerns . . . reciprocal buying
may be a device by which each supports and helps consolidate the strength
of the other, so that independent producers of both commodities are
deprived of market opportunities."'" Moreover, since reciprocal trading
is predicated upon the power to make quantity purchases, the already
large and diversified firm which participates in many markets is able to
use this existing purchasing strength to increase geometrically its size. A
final factor to consider is that reciprocity can be employed to extract
higher prices for the practioner's products than would normally be paid.
For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission noted that large ship-
pers suggested to carriers that "in view of the routing of traffic which
they control, the carriers could afford to pay them a higher price for
their commodities than might be necessary to pay other manufacturers
. . . having little or no traffic to offer." 2
III. THE LEGALITY OF RECIPROCITY UNDER
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
The only existing avenue to the regulation or prohibition of recip-
rocal trading is through the network of antitrust legislation. However,
as has been pointed out, there is no language in any of the various trade
regulation statutes designed specifically to curb the practice. The crucial
problem is to determine whether a particular reciprocal buying situation
30. See generally BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
31. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 179 (1949).
32. Reciprocity in Purchasing and Rouling, supra note 9, at 424.
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can be fitted into the judicially recognized meaning of the words and
phrases of existing statutes. The Consolidated Foods case is the only
case to date in which the Supreme Court has furnished guidelines re-
solving this problem. Confronted with an alleged violation of the anti-
merger section of the Clayton Act,3 the Court struck down reciprocity
through asset acquisition.
It should be mentioned that there is a close relationship between
mergers and reciprocity. All three of the recognized forms of merger-
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate-furnish fertile opportunity for
reciprocal trading. By horizontally increasing its holdings a firm can
obtain the purchasing strength that reciprocal buying requires for suc-
cess. The other two merger types can yield a situation whereby the
acquiring firm's suppliers become potential customers of the acquired
company-thus opening up an opportunity for the acquiring firm to
direct pressure towards the new customer-suppliers.
In order to appreciate fully the problems involved in relating recip-
rocal buying to Section 7, it would be worthwhile to review the relevant
history of that Act.
When Section 7 was first enacted in 1914,"4 it was designed to serve
as a shield against aggrandizement of the holding ccmpany.3" The hold-
ing company was, during that period, the prevalent and traditional
method used to exert monopolistic control. As a result of this back-
ground, Section 7 originally dealt only with acquisition of the stock of a
competing firm."G Subsequent application revealed the striking impotence
and limited scope of the act. A merger could still le effected by merely
acquiring the assets of a competitor." The same immunity applied when
33. Clayton Act § 7, 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 1:3 (1958).
34. Clayton Act § 7, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
35. "A merger movement which had begun at the end of the nineteenth century
& extended through 1907 was background for the merger sectio a of the 1914 act. During
that period, most mergers were effected through the purchase of stock. The most usual
form of merger was for one corporation to buy the controlling stock of a competitive
corporation, because it was easier to purchase stock than as .ets. This was especially
true in the case of holding companies, since the holding company could readily ex-
change some of its shares for the stock of a company it was absorbing." FEDERAL TRADE
Co}isIvssIoN, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcgUI$STIONS 145 (1955). See,
HoUsE JUDICIARY COmIITTEE REPORT 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Ses 3. 3-5 (1949).
36. The original § 7 read as follows: "No corporation .. . shall acquire, directly
or indircctly, the whole or any part of the stock or share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired & the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 38 STA.T. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1952).
37. Arrow-Hart & H. Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 291 U.S. 587 (1933);
Federal Trade Com. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
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stock acquisitions were subsequently converted into asset holdings.88
Finally, after prolonged agitation," an amendment was passed in 1950
that closed these and other loopholes4" and thus converted a formerly
anemic law into an efficacious antimerger weapon. The germane part of
amended Section 7 now reads as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
A prevailing explanation for the passage of the 1950 amendment
"was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic con-
centration in the American economy."4  In short, it was thought that
there was imminent possibility of economic strangulation through a wave
of corporate mergers. The reasons advanced for the explosive prolifera-
tion of mergers since 1945 are numerous : to increase overall operating
efficiency, as a means of balancing oligopoly power in a particular in-
dustry," or because the acquisition of competitors would provide "an
opportunity for quick attainment of economies of scale, diversification,
and stability of operation in both production and distribution without
further competitive struggle." ' Moreover, the conglomerate merger,"'
where a firm acquires the facilities to manufacture and market non-
competing or unrelated goods, produces a pertinent advantage in that
new customer-supplier relationships are opened up for reciprocal buying
38. Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 272 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1926). For
a discussion of merger activity under the original § 7 see Markham, Merger Policy Under
the New Section 7: A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. REv. 489, 500-09 (1952).
39. Between 1943 and 1949 sixteen bills to amend § 7 were introduced to Congress.
Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 311-12 (1962). See, TEmPORARY NATIONAL
EcoNomic COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT AND REcomiMiENDATIONS, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1941).
40. See, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERs AND AcQUIsiTIONS, supra note 35, at 154-
60; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 115-17 (1955).
41. Clayton Act § 7, 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
42. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
43. For a summary of the factors that precipitate mergers see BURNS, A STUDY
OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 280-2 (1958).
44. The merger of two small firms might convert a "Big Four" oligopolistic
industry into a "Big Five." See generally Stewart & Turner, The Significance of
Oligopoly in Acquisition and Exchsive Dealing Situations Under the Clayton Act,
25 CINN. L. REv. 427 (1956).
45. REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 35, at 10.
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exploration. It was a conglomerate merger situation that confronted the
Court in the Consolidated Foods case.
Reciprocity As the Determinative Factor in a Section 7 Violation:
The Consolidated Foods Case
Consolidated Foods Corp., incorporated as a wholesale grocery
house, operates from a broad and diverse base of food industry enter-
prises. In keeping with the trend of the times it attained its present
position of dominance through a series of mergers. In 1955 the Federal
Trade Commission noted that "This outstanding example of an organiza-
tion in the food industry which combines production and wholesale dis-
tribution on a large scale has developed mainly by the acquisition of
existing wholesale grocery and food processing co-mpanies during the
past 10 years."4 In 1951 Consolidated acquired the assets and business
of Gentry, Inc., a firm that concentrated on manufacturing dehydrated
onion and garlic."8 The dehydrated onion and garlic industry was an
oligopoly. There were three domestic producers-Gentry, which, at the
time of the merger, accounted for 28 percent of dehydrated onion sales
and for 51 percent of the garlic market, Basic Vegetable Products, Inc.,
which controlled 60 percent and 36 percent of the dehydrated onion and
garlic market respectively, and Pucinelli Packing Co., which accounted
for the remainder or around 10 percent of total sal,2s of both products.
By 1958 Gentry had increased its share of dehydrated onion sales to 35
percent (Basic's share dropped from 60 percent to 57 percent) but its
garlic market share dropped to 39 percent-a 12 percent loss. During
the same time Basic increased garlic sales to 14 percent.49 The primary
market for dehydrated onions and garlic is the food processing industry
where firms such as Armour and Swift use these items in the manu-
facture of their food products.
It was necessary that Consolidated Foods, as a wholesale distributor
and retailer of food products, make sizeable purchases from food pro-
cessors. The gravamen of the Federal Trade Conmission's complaint
46. See generally F.T.C. RELEASE, NATURE OF CONGLO1E ATE MERGERS (Dec. 15,
1955); EDWARDS, CONGLOmERATE BIGNESS AS A SourRc OF POWER, BUSINESS CON-
CENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331 (1955); Blair, The Conglonerate Merger in Eco-
nomics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958); Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monwpoly
Policy Upon Multi-Prodiwt Firms, 98 U.PA.L.REv. 320 (1950) ; Hrusoff, Conglomerate
Mergers: Joint Ventures, Market Extensions and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 69
DIcK. L. REv. 113 (1965) ; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HAuv. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
47. REPORT oN CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONS, s'pra note 35, at 117.
48. Gentry had assets valued at $1,600,000 and operated two plants. Consolidated
Foods' assets at the time of merger totaled $60,000,000. Consolidated Foods Corp. v.
F.T.C., 329 F.2d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 1964).
49. Id. at 625.
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was that Consolidated Foods used this substantial purchasing power as a
means of persuading its suppliers to buy their supply of dehydrated onions
and garlic from Gentry. The merger of Consolidated Foods with Gentry
was, therefore, destroying competition in the dehydrated onion and garlic
industry." There is complete agreement among the three bodies which
heard the case that Consolidated did, on various occasions, overtly en-
deavor to implement reciprocal trading arrangements with their suppliers.
However, there is some conflict as to the degree of success achieved by
Consolidated Foods. The Seventh Circuit, relying upon a statistical
comparison between 1950 and 1958, concluded:
And here 10 years of post-acquisition experience-during
which Consolidated attempted overt enforcement of reciprocal
buying practice where it deemed it might be successful-serves
to demonstrate that neither the acquisition of Gentry, in and of
itself, nor the overt attempts to use buying power to influence
sellers to Consolidated to purchase from Gentry resulted in
substantial anticompetitive effect. No substantial impact on
the relevant market occurred, and absent some factor which
requires a different approach we are of the view that the experi-
ence reflected by this post acquisition period must weigh heavily
in appraising future probabilities.51
In reversing the decision of the circuit court the Supreme Court sug-
gested that too much weight had been given post-acquisition evidence.52
However, the essential area of dissidence between the two courts resides
in the character of the interpretation that is to be given this evidence.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in an opinion that abounds with quotations from
the Federal Trade Commission decision, did not accept as the determining
factor in the case the statistical evaluation of the relative market positions
of the firms participating in the dehydrated onion and garlic industry.
The fact that Gentry was unable to improve appreciably its market posi-
tion even though attempts at reciprocity were made was not controlling
since a close reading of the record reveals more salient factors. These
factors are the peculiar nature of the industry in question and the fact
that Gentry was an influential participant in an oligopoly.
50. The F.T.C. noted that the merger "created the serious danger that Gentry
would acquire a protected market, in which fair competitive opportunities would be
denied to other sellers of dehydrated onion and garlic, as a result of the trade practice
known as 'reciprocity'." Consolidated Foods Corp., Dit. 7000, TRADE R G. REP. 16182
at 20974 (Transfer Binder 1961-63).
51. 329 F.2d at 626. See generally Note, The Consolidated Foods Case: A New
Section 7 Test for the Conglonerate Merger, 49 VA. L. REv. 852 (1963).
52. 380 U.S. at 598.
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1. The "Peculiar" Nature of the Industry.
Gentry and its competitors did not manufacture their respective
products with the same technical competence. Basic Vegetable Products
had historically been the leader in eliminating technical defects in the
dehydration productive process. The Supreme Court adopted the Com-
mission's findings that although Gentry had made inroads on Basic's
superior technical proficiency the latter firm still maintained the lead.
(It was acknowledged that Puccinelli's products were of a quality below
its competitors'.) Yet, even with its technical lead and the capacity to
place a superior product on the market, Basic was nevertheless unable to
dominate the dehydrated onion and garlic industry. The share of the
market relationship between the two dominant firms remained almost
constant in the years following the merger. To the Court the most
plausible explanation for Gentry's ability to maintain its position against
a competitor with a superior product was the use of reciprocal buying
power by Consolidated Foods. 3
2. The Capacity of the Acquired Firm to Command a Substantial Share
of the Market.
Before reciprocity through merger can be curbed the requisite ele-
ments of a Section 7 violation must be satisfied. Mere proof that the
acquisition results in the use of reciprocal buying practices is not suffi-
cient. The Government still has the burden of demcnstrating that, as a
result of the acquisition, competition may be lessened or that there is the
probability of a monopoly developing." In the Consolidated Foods case
the Court indicated that the pivotal factor in fulfilling this requirement
was the fact that Gentry occupied a position of comiderable strength in
what was actually a two firm oligopoly. Because of its power, any move
that Gentry made, regardless of the acquisition, woald have significant
impact on the pattern of competition in the dehydrated onion and garlic
industry. And the merger of Gentry with a large company which used
53. The Court cited with approval the following analys is by the Commission:
"If reciprocal buying creates for Gentry a protected markct, which others cannot
penetrate despite superiority of price, quality, or service, competition is lessened whether
or not Gentry can expand its market share. . . . It is for this reason that we reject
respondents' argument that the decline of its share of the girlic market proves the
ineffectiveness of reciprocity. We do not know that its share would not have fallen
still farther, had it not been for the influence of reciprocal buying." Id. at 599.
54. In summarizing the effects of reciprocity the Commission stated that if the
action had been under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission At, an order to cease and
desist would have been justified without further analysis. But since the action was under
§ 7 the Commission was required "to consider, in the context of Section 7, whether the
merger . . . brought about a change in the structure of the industry whose effect-in
relation to reciprocity-may be substantially to lessen competition." Consolidated Foods
Corp., Dkt. 7000, TRADE REG. REP. f1 16182 at 20978 (Transfer Binder 1961-63).
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its newly gained strategic market position and purchasing power to exert
an influence on the sales situation in the oligopoly was a strong indication
that competition was being lessened. In effect, the use of reciprocity,
brought about by the merger, disturbed the fragile competitive equilib-
rium between the two oligopolists. The Commission concluded" and
the Court agreed that:
With two firms accounting for better than 85%o of both
product lines for eleven successive years, maximum concentra-
tion short of monopoly has already been achieved. If it is de-
sirable to prevent a trend toward oligopoly, it is a fortiori de-
sirable to remove . . . obstacles to the creation of genuinely
competitive conditions in an oligopolistic industry. Respond-
ent's reciprocal buying power, obtained through acquisition of
Gentry, is just such an anti-competitive obstacle."
Certainly one Supreme Court decision provides a somewhat feeble
foundation for accurate prediction. However, it does seem clear that in
the Consolidated Foods case the Court revealed a commitment to the
proposition that if (1) the acquired firm controls a substantial portion
of the market and (2) is the recipient of the benefits of reciprocal buying
due to the activities of the acquiring firm then competition has been
affected sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of Section 7. This con-
clusion, in itself, raises significant questions. For example, what are
the quantitive dimensions of "a substantial portion of the market?"
Gentry exercised dominion over approximately 32 percent of the de-
hydrated onion and garlic industry. This was considered "substantial."
Would any degree of market control below this figure be considered
substantial and if so, how far below? Assuming that the acquired firm
occupies a position of dominance, is it sufficient to demonstrate merely
that the threat and opportunity for reciprocity were present and hence a
"probability" existed that it would be used, or is it necessary to prove the
actual use and success of the practice?
Another problem is foreclosure. A successful reciprocal buying
arrangement automatically closes the market to competitors of the acquir-
ed firm. How great must the foreclosure be or, stated differently, how
much buying influence (power to foreclose) must the suppliers of the
acquiring firm have in the acquired firm's market? The Federal Trade
Commission was impressed by the fact that "firms that both supplied
Consolidated and bought in volume from Gentry purchased more than
25% of the onion produced by the industry and not quite 25% of the
55. Id. at 20980.
56. 380 U.S. at 597.
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garlic." 7  A related question is how much purchasing pressure must the
acquiring firm be capable of exerting? There seems little doubt that it
must be sufficient to be persuasive in prompting sup pliers to buy from
the acquired firm. The Supreme Court merely noted that Consolidated
Foods was a "substantial purchaser.""8  However, there is added con-
fusion in this area. A company's ostensible buying power may disinte-
grate under analysis. And this is exactly what occurred according to
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. Consolidated's actual field of
persuasion was reduced because it was unable to influence its economic-
ally independent suppliers such as Armour and Swift." Finally, would
obstacles not encountered in the Consolidated Foods case, such as deline-
ating the relevant market and defining the line of commerce, have any
effect on the central issue of determining the legality of reciprocal buying
practices in terms of Section 7 of the Clayton Act? Obviously these are
questions that can only be cleared up through additioral decisions."0
The Government subsequently used the Consolidated Foods case in
support of a motion for a preliminary injunction in U.S. v. Penick and
Ford, Ltd., Inc.6" It was charged that the impending merger of Reynolds
Tobacco Co. with Penick and Ford violated Section 7 because Reynolds
would take advantage of the opportunity to use its comiderable purchasing
power to foster Penick's growth at the expense of competition. Penick
is the fourth largest of ten firms which manufacture and market corn
starch products. Its share of the over-all market is 12.8 percent.62  The
relevant market (the entire U.S.) and the line of commerce (corn wet
57. Consolidated Foods Corp., Dkt. 7000, TRADE RaG. REP. 1 16182 at 20980
(Transfer Binder 1961-63).
58. 380 U.S. at 595.
59. Justice Stewart noted that these two large firms have "built significant brand
names commanding consumer acceptance of their products. For such companies, exposure
at the retail market is assured. Consolidated Foods, as the wholesaler, is sufficiently
dependent on such processors that its economic power over this class is minimal. It
cannot readily strong-arm Armour into purchasing dehydrated onions from Gentry at the
pain of losing Consolidated's favor." 380 U.S. at 607. Professor Turner, writing before
the Supreme Court handed down its decision, came to a simifar conclusion. Turner,
supra note 46, at 1393.
60. A factual background similar to Consolidated Foods appeared in U.S. v. General
Dynamics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) ff 71518 (S.D.N.Y., April 9,
1965). In a conglomerate merger General Dynamics Corp. acquired Liquid Carbonic
Corp., a firm that participated in an oligopoly as the largest producer of domestic carbon
dioxide. The trial court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, utilized the
broad principles laid down in the Consolidated Foods case. The following factors were
deemed significant: 1. The purchasing power of the acquirin . firm was substantial,
2. The acquired firm exercised control over a large (35% to 40/ ) portion of the market
in which they participated, 3. At least 75% of General Dynamic's suppliers were
potential users of Liquid Carbonic Corp.'s products, 4. There was clear evidence of
overt reciprocal buying pressure being applied.
61. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1 71457 (D.N.J. April 6, 1965).
62. Id. at 81000-01.
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milling process products) were established without conflict. The pri-
mary purchaser of the corn wet milling process products is the corrugated
box industry. The allegation of reciprocity was predicated on the fact
that Reynolds was a large user of paper and cardboard products and
hence there was an inference that this strategic relationship would be
used to persuade suppliers to purchase from Penick and Ford. This
inference was reinforced by the past history of reciprocity in the acquired
firm's industry. The Government's position was summarized by the
court:
It is urged that the presence in the industry of reciprocal
trading policies and the degree to which they currently abound
therein gives rise to the inference that should a major source
of purchasing power be inserted into the existing structure,
competition would be greatly injured as a result of the increased
reciprocal power which could be generated by a corporation of
great financial magnitude."
The lack of post-acquisition evidence forced the Government to rest
its case on the above theory. It is quite apparent that the core of the
theory, i.e., that a history of reciprocity in an industry, plus the injection
of the purchasing power of a large acquiring firm automatically lessens
competition, was drastically diluted by the factual background. In dis-
missing the Government's motion and distinguishing the Consolidated
Foods case, the court noted that Penick and Ford did not dominate the
corn starch products market-12.8 percent does not constitute substantial
control. Reciprocal trading as a significant influence in the corn starch
industry was belied by the intense competition among the 10 firms and
by the highly successful entry of a new firm.64 Moreover, Reynolds did
not rely upon reciprocal buying arrangements in its dealings prior to the
merger in question. "At no time did the Government show or introduce
proof that Reynolds had ever deviated from the non-reciprocal policy
either in its own business or in the business of the concerns acquired by
it under its diversification program." 5  Finally, there was doubt as to
63. Id. at 81002.
64. "The industry structure under consideration is far different than the oligopol-
istic market found in Consolidated. The corn wet milling industry has ten viable,
aggressive competitiors none of which clearly dominates the entire market as Gentry
and Basic did in Consolidated. Furthermore, the history of the industry as presented
by the proofs evidence the entry into the competitive market by a new company (Grain
Processing) which through the use of more efficient production means was able to
effectively engage in price competition and swiftly move to the head of the industry
in . . . 3/ years. While reciprocal trade relations was present in the industry, it was
an insufficient factor to stifle the meteoric rise of this company." Id. at 81004.
65. Id. at 81004.
RECIPROCAL TRADING
Reynolds' capacity to influence. This was because its connection with
the corn starch products industry was through a single supplier whose
dependence for supplies from the acquired firm or its competitors was
open to question. The theory advanced by the Government has not yet
received an adequate test. Given a more congenial fact foundation it
would perhaps yield a different result.
Reciprocity As A Peripheral Factor in Section 7 Violations
Reciprocity has been the controlling issue very few times in any
antitrust suit."0 Likewise it has made an infrequent and sometimes
barely discernible appearance as a secondary force in Section 7 decisions."
The trial court record of United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours and
Co.68 furnishes a worthwhile description of a case where the existence of
reciprocal trading is acknowledged but is discounted as playing an in-
consequential role. The case also reflects the wide range of reciprocal
buying opportunities available to the large diversified organizations.
During the years 1917 to 1919, Du Pont acquired a 23 percent
stock interest in General Motors. It was alleged that Du Pont used this
stock ownership as a means of securing the new and potentially enormous
market that General Motors represented and in doing so automatically
precluded competitors from that market. The case reflects a two level
view of reciprocal trading. There is the broad concept of reciprocity
that motivated the entire transaction and there are specific manifesta-
tions of reciprocal buying that are discussed in detail by the trial court.
When Du Pont channeled funds earmarked for expansion purposes
into the purchase of General Motors stock it did so with the anticipation of
gaining a new group of customers. "A major consideration was that an
expanding General Motors would provide a substantial market needed
by the burgeoning duPont organization." 9 It was, therefore, a purchase
made with the primary objective of inducing return purchases. And
this is, of course, the fundamental principle upon which reciprocity is
predicated. While the Supreme Court directed its attention towards
66. See, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra.
67. One of the earliest § 7 cases in which the use of reciprocity is recognizable,
although barely, is United States v. New England Fish Exchang e, 258 F. 732 (D. Mass.
1919). In order to control fish sales, a group of Boston fish dealers arranged to have
all the fresh fish caught in the immediate area channelled through one central wharf
or "Exchange." Subsequent stock acquisition mergers among the dealers precipitated
§ 7 charges. A close reading of the decision indicates that the dealers combined purchas-
ing power was used to persuade the trawler captains to pay a stiff fee for the use of the
Exchange. Translated into contemporary reciprocity venacul r, the fish dealers said,
"Ve will buy fish only from those trawlers who use our wharf and of course pay the
accompanying fee."
68. 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
69. 353 U.S. at 601.
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Du Pont's defense that the stock purchases were for investment purposes
only," -the undercurrent of reciprocity that supported the entire transac-
tion was also revealed. Note the following language describing the
activities of a Du Pont executive which indicates Du Pont's motive for
the stock purchases and their determination to make sure that their in-
vestment generated the anticipated reciprocal purchases:
Haskell frankly and openly set about gaining the maximum
share of the General Motors market for duPont. In a con-
temporaneous 1918 document, he reveals his intention to pave
the way for perhaps a more general adoption of our material,
and that he was thinking how best to get cooperation (from
the several General Motors Divisions) whereby makers of such
of the low priced cars as it would seem possible and wise to get
transferred will be put in the frame of mind necessary for its
adoption (duPont's artificial leather).
Haskell set up lines of communication within General
Motors to be in a position to know at all times what duPont
products and what products of duPont competitors were being
used. It is not pure imagination to suppose that such surveil-
lance from that source made an impressive impact upon pur-
chasing officials. It would be understandably difficult for
them not to interpret it as meaning that a preference was to be
given to duPont products."
The reciprocity underlying the origins of the Du Pont-General
Motors relationship was obscured by the ensuing proliferation of indus-
trial might of both organizations and by the more obvious issue of
whether the stock connection "led to the insulation of most of General
Motors market from free competition, with the resultant likelihood . . .
of the creation of a monopoly of a line of commerce."" However, sub-
sequent activities by both firms yielded more identifiable manifestations
of reciprocal buying." For example, General Motors effectively utilized
the Trade Relations Department concept. That is, selling and buying
data from the entire G.M. structure was coordinated under the super-
vision of a General Purchasing Committee, which consolidated purchasing
70. The Government, at the trial stage, placed principle emphasis on alleged viola-
tions of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the
charges, the Supreme Court based its decision exclusively on § 7 of the original Clayton
Act. See generally HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERsrECTIvE 49-70 (1957).
71. 353 U.S. at 603.
72. Id. at 589.
73. For a summary of General Motors' reciprocal trading activities as developed
by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1955 hearings see BURNS, A STmU
OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 388-89, 408 (1958).
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power into a single force. The significance of General Motor's expand-
ing purchasing power and the stock leverage possessed by the Du Pont
organization did not escape the notice of the Du Pont officials. In
noting that they received special consideration from Bethlehem Steel
because of the purchases G.M. made from that firm and that Bethlehem
considered Du Pont and G.M. as a single interest, a Du Pont executive
"conceived the idea that it might be of value to duPont to use their
purchasing power for the purpose of influencing concerns from whom
they purchased to purchase in turn from them, that if the purchasing
power of General Motors were added to that of duPont . . . it would
result in securing large business for duPont. . . .
That Du Pont exhibited a sensitivity to the possibilities of reciprocal
buying is apparent."' But the trial court discovered that this "sensitivity"
was restricted to Du Pont and that reciprocity did nct emanate from the
General Motors-Du Pont relationship."6  The Du Pont case does not,
therefore, constitute even minimum authority on reciprocal buying. Yet,
the case does raise the question of whether a situation could arise where
Section 7 is violated even though there is no overt attempt by either of
the merged firms to assert reciprocal purchasing power pressure. Did
not Bethlehem Steel consider, without prompting, the advantages of
buying from Du Pont as a means of insuring sales to General Motors?
In other words, what happens when the relationship between the merged
firms and suppliers is such that the advantage of reciprocity to the latter
is so evident that no pressure from the possessors cf the buying power
is necessary? "Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen
competition . . .' to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not
certainties.""7  Whether the above described situation measures up to the
dimensions of "probability" has not yet been given conclusive judicial
treatment. However, Mr. Justice Stewart, in conc-urring in the Con-
74. 126 F. Supp. at 279.
75. The Supreme Court noted only one instance of reciprocity and it was not
directly related to the G.M.-duPont situation. "Chrysler bought Duco in large volume
until the early 1930's when, in pursuance of a policy to obt in supplies to whom it
would be the most important customer, it concentrated its purchases on one company,
Pittsburgh Plate Glass." 353 U.S. at 634.
76. For a well substantiated view contra see Stocking and Mueller, Business
Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. Chi. 73 (1957), where at 82-3 the
authors describe the cooperation between the two firms in the following language:
"DuPont apparently found General Motors' disposition of its request satisfactory and
from time to time took advantage of General Motors' willingness to lend its purchasing
power on special occasions to DuPont to help it get business. As early as August 13,
1924, Sloan had informed Lynak that DuPont had requested General Motors' help in
contacting Fisk Rubber Company and that, after a meeting in a General Motors'
executive's office between DuPont & Fisk representatives, 'a very valuable business
has been given to the duPont interest by the Fisk people'."
77. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
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solidated Foods case, did indicate that "It obviously requires more than
this kind of bare potential for reciprocal buying to bring a merger within
the ban of § 7.""rs To him "the mere effort at reciprocity cannot be the
basis for finding the probability of a significant alteration in the market
structure."" On the other hand, in U.S. v. Ingersall-Rand Company,"0
the mere presence of reciprocal buying power was taken into considera-
tion as a secondary factor by the trial court in granting a preliminary
injunction. The court noted that the steel suppliers of Ingersall-Rand
"may tend to prefer the acquired companies as the source of supply of
equipment used in his 'captive' mines, and the advantage accruing to him
would not have to be pointed out by Ingersall-Rand." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 8
If the few reciprocity through merger cases are analyzed in terms
of the totality of Section 7 decisions, it is possible to distill some tentative
conclusions. It appears that in those antimerger actions in which re-
ciprocal buying plays the determinative role or is a prominent influence,
the acquired firm must exert substantial control over the industry in
which it competes. The quantitative boundaries of "substantial control"
are as yet undetermined. Moreover, the tripartite relationship between
the acquiring firm, its suppliers and the acquired concern must be vigor-
ous. The purchasing strength of the acquiring firm must be powerful
enough so that its suppliers find it sufficiently advantageous to buy from
the acquired firm. Likewise the suppliers must possess sufficient buying
78. 380 U.S. at 603.
79. Id. at 604. This seems to be in accord with the trial court's attitude in U.S.
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963). The Government citing
Pennsalt's history of reciprocal trading, alleged that the joint venture between Olin
and Pennsalt to manufacture and market sodium chlorate would allow them "to use
their combined buying power as a basis for making reciprocal arrangements with vendors
who are sodium chlorate buyers, which will give Penn-Olin an undue sales advantage
over its competitors." U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra at 126. The court, relying
on the fact that since the inception of the venture competition increased their plant
facilities and a new competitor had entered the market, concluded, at 126, that "what-
ever advantage Penn-Olin might be able to obtain through reciprocity arrange-
ments . . . scarcely warrants the conclusion that as a matter of reasonable probability
Penn-Olin will ultimately dominate the sodium chlorate market." The Supreme Court,
focusing on whether there was a "reasonable probability that either one of the corpor-
ations would have entered the market by building a plant, while the other would have
remained a significant potential competitor," remanded the case for further findings.
U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1964).
80. 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963). The
defendant. a world wide manufacturer of industrial machinery, acquired the assets and
property of three companies: Goodman Mfg. Co., a leading manufacturer of under-
ground coal mining machinery; Lee-Norse, who produces continuous miners and in 1961
accounted for more than 51% of that market; and Galis Electric and Mfg. Co., a
manufacturer of various types of drills used in underground coal mining machinery.
The size and market position of the acquiring firm and of the three acquired firms
reduced reciprocal trading factors to secondary importance.
81. 320 F.2d at 524.
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capacity so that changes in their sources of supply will affect the market
position of the acquired firm and its competitors. In fact, it has been
argued that "the percentage of market accounted for by the acquired
firm in its line of commerce . . . is not as significant . . . as the
volume of the acquiring firms' purchases from its supplier and the size
and power of those suppliers." 2  There is oblique support for this com-
ment through Mr. Justice Stewart's suggestion that the quality of the
economic position of the supplier must be examined."3 Some suppliers,
because of public acceptance, or other reasons, might be immune to any
reciprocal leverage attempted by the acquiring firm.
The number of Section 7 cases in which the courts' attention will be
focused on reciprocal buying will increase sharply. This is due in part
to an ever increasing awareness of the intrinsic anti-competitive features
of the practice. Reciprocity very definitely "has little or nothing to be
said in its favor."84  And perhaps just as important to the rise in the
attention being given this aspect of buying power is the ascendancy of
the conglomerate merger.8 " The possible methods of attacking the vertical
and horizontal mergers have, to a great extent, crystallized into recogniz-
able patterns. This is not true with the conglomerate merger. Judicial
attitudes toward this form of merger are still in a state of development.8 "
It has been pointed out that:
Neither the legislative history nor the law itself provides
any clue as to the legal or economic theory tinder which the
acquisition by one company of another engaged in an unrelated
or noncompeting geographical or product mar!ket might result
in a 'substantial lessening of competition.' . . .s8
The expanding recognition of the conclusive manner in which re-
ciprocal trading stifles competition means that the existence of the
practice will become an inviting route through which the conglomerate
merger can be attacked. If the necessary customer-supplier relationship
exists and there is provable evidence of reciprocal buying pressures the
82. Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9
ANTITRUsT BuLL. 93, 98 (1964).
83. See, note 59 supra.
84. Turner, supra note 46, at 1387.
85. See, ANNUAL REPORT OF TEE FEDERAL TRADE COmmIssioN 39 (1964).
86. Regardless of the present state of judicial interpretation, it is clear that the
amended § 7 applies "to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate
as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substantially lessening com-
petition . . . or tending to create a monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1949).
87. Bums, supra note 73, at 307.
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chances of the conglomerate merger surviving successful prosecution are
considerably lessened.
VI. RECIPROCITY UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COimISSION ACT
Unlike Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which depends upon asset or
stock acquisition as the sine qua non for application, the language of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Acte' can operate as a direct
impediment to reciprocity. In three Section 5 cases to date, Waugh
Equip. Co., 9 Mechanical Mfg. Co.," and California Packing Corp.,"' the
Commission has issued cease and desist orders premised upon the anti-
competitive effects of reciprocal trading. These cases, all handed down
in the 1930's and none of which received appellate court review, constitute,
along with the legislative commentary supporting the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the only sources from which meaningful conclusions
can be formed as to the scope of Section 5's coverage of reciprocity.
Section 5 is potentially the most elastic and far reaching piece of
legislation in the antitrust repertory. The succinctness of its terminology
is exceedingly deceptive. The germane portion reads as follows: "Un-
fair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."92  Since amendatory
language was added in 1938 the utilization of the act to shield the con-
sumer from misrepresentation and other deceptive practices" has over-
shadowed the original expansive embargo on "unfair methods of com-
petition." But it is, of course, the latter phrasing, representing as it does
a relatively untapped reservoir of regulatory power, that is relevant to
the problem of reciprocity. The language is so broad as to lack definitive
precision. As a result there has not been a consistent pattern in the
judicial delineation of activity held to be violative of this section of the
act. Moreover, the labyrinth of pre-enactment statements 4 by legislators
encumbers the already complex problem of interpretation. The debates
accompanying the proposed piece of legislation were mixed with such
88. 38 STAT. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51.
89. 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
90. 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
91. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
92. 38 STAT. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
93. See generally CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMIPETITION AND TRADE
MARKS (1945); DIGGS, THE MODERN LAW OF ADVERTISING AND MARKETING (1948);
HARDING, THE POPULAR PRACTICE OF FRAUD (1935); Callmann, False Advertising as a
Competitive Tort, 48 CoLumr. L. REv. 876 (1948); Nims, Unfair Competition by False
Statement or Disparagement, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 63 (1933); Stein, Testimonial Adver-
tisng and the Federal Trade Commission, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 340 (1949).
94. For a concise summary of the legislative background of § 5 see HENDERSON,
FEDERAL TRADE ComIsSSIoN 1-49 (1924).
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a cross-current of definition and explication that one commentator was
prompted to remark that "almost any construction of § 5 can be found
in the protracted and wearisome debates during the 3ummer of 1914.""°
A most notable attribute of the statute is the intentional absence of defini-
tion. A compendious and articulate explanation for this omission was
furnished by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the following language:
Instead of undertaking to define what practices should be
deemed unfair, as had been done in earlier legislation, the Act
left the determination to the Commission. Experience with
existing laws had taught that definition, being necessarily rigid,
would prove embarrassing, and if rigorously applied, might
involve great hardship. Methods of competition which would
be unfair in one industry, under certain circumstances, might,
when adopted in another industry, or even in the same industry
under different circumstances, be entirely unobjectionable.
Furthermore an enumeration, however comprehensive, of exist-
ing methods of unfair competition, must necess-,,rily soon prove
incomplete, as, with new conditions constantly arising, novel
unfair methods would be devised and developed.9"
That the Commission must give particularized substance to Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has often been stated. How-
ever, the Commission's license to give meaning to the Act has court
imposed boundaries. It is left to the courts to develop the legal standards
that are to be applied in determining whether a practice is an unfair
method of competition. A pertinent legal standard is that the act does
apply to market activities that have not yet ripened into antitrust viola-
95. Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Conimission Over False Ad-
'vertising, 31 CoLUm. L. RER. 527, 531 (1931).
"From the various definitions offered, 'unfair competition' seemed to include-
A. Every act of passing off one's business or goods for another's.
B. All methods of competition tending to restraint of trade or monopoly which
have been forbidden by the Sherman Law.
C. Substantially all violations of the antitrust laws.
D. All unfair methods of stifling competition.
E. All other acts which the 'Commission . . .decides . . . may lead to monopoly
or restraint of trade' though not now forbidden by .he Sherman Act.
F. All other acts affecting a competitor for which 'a remedy lies either at law
or in equity.'
G. All other acts which either affect a competitor and are 'against public morals'
or in any way interfere with economic 'efficiency' though heretofore quite
lawful and not forbidden by the Sherman Law or by any other law."
Montague, The Commnission's Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of Trade:
A Large Scale Method of Mass Enforcement of the Anti-Trus, Laws, 8 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 365 (1940). See generally, MiiERa, UNFAIR CoMmEITION (1941).
96. Federal Trade Com. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1919).
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tions.9" In addition, Section 5 is not necessarily confined to conduct that
was illegal at common law or that has been condemned by the Sherman
or Clayton Acts.9" Obviously these legal standards are, of themselves,
broad enough to invite further elucidation. In any case, it is against the
wide tapestry of the original language, over which legal standards have
been superimposed, that reciprocal trading must be viewed.
The Cases: A Trilogy of Coercive Reciprocity
The Waugh case provides an excellent illustration of the severe
market disturbances caused by reciprocal buying and the potential ad-
vantages it can assure.
Organized in 1902 to manufacture railroad draft gears the Waugh
Draft Gear Co. led, at best, a marginal existence. However, an abrupt
change for the better occurred in 1924 when the company was reorganized
into the Waugh Equipment Co. The new firm issued 7,000 shares of com-
mon stock-2,000 going to former shareholders while the remaining
5,000 passed, without consideration, to the two promotors of the ven-
ture. Sometime within the next four months three Armour and Co.
executives (executive vice-president, vice-president in charge of traffic,
and the latter's assistant) received one-third of the promotion stock.
The Federal Trade Commission contended that in exchange for the
stock the three Armour officials agreed "to use their influence with the
officials of the railroads, particularly the traffic officials and through
them the executive and other departmental officials of the railroads, to
solicit and secure orders for the draft gears sold by the Waugh Equip-
ment Co."99 Armour, as a large meat packer with subsidiaries all over
the U.S., was a substantial purchaser of railroad traffic facilities. The
influence that it could exert on the various railroads eagerly competing
for their business was considerable. This influence was magnified by
the fact that Waugh's competitors did not have the necessary relationship
with a large purchaser of railroad traffic facilities and thus were unable
to retaliate with reciprocal buying pressure of their own.
There was a remarkable change in the fortunes of the newly organ-
ized company. In 1924 Waugh's sales of draft gears for new freight
equipment were less than 1 percent. By 1930 their sales figure had
jumped to 35 percent-tops in the market. The fact that it was not until
1929 that Waugh was able to place a product of competitive quality on
the market is an impressive testimonial to the power of reciprocity.
97. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Corn., 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466
(1940).
98. Federal Trade Com. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1933).
99. 15 F.T.C. at 239.
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In concluding that the activities of Waugh and the three Armour
executives "under the conditions and circumstances described in the . . .
findings . . . are unfair methods of competition' 0 the Commission was
on solid ground. The facts clearly indicated that competition had been
drastically lessened and that there was an excellent chance of Waugh
monopolizing the draft gear industry. Hence, the effect of the cease
and desist order was "to nip in the bud practices which, when full blown,
would violate the Sherman or Clayton Act."'' However, the key to the
decision seems to be the unrestrained and coercive manner in which
reciprocity was used. Threats to withdraw business unless purchases
were made from Waugh were communicated and, on occasion, actually
carried out. The effect of these threats by an economic force of the
magnitude of Armour was to prevent "the customers to whom the re-
spondent corporation and its competitors are trying to sell their products,
from exercising their free will and judgment in determining which device
is the most efficient and will best serve their needs at the lowest net
cost. .. ,,02 Moreover, the exchange of stock between the promotors
of the reorganized Waugh Equipment Co. and the Armour officials was
consciously predicated on the anticipated use of reciprocal buying. Final-
ly the Commission was impressed by the respondent's monopoly on re-
ciprocal buying. Since they were not significant customers of the rail-
roads, it was impossible for competitors to retaliate-unless they resorted
to bribery.
The factual background in Mechanical Manufacturing Co. decision
is in many respects similar to the Waugh case."3 Swift and Co.,
also large meat packers, used their sizeable status as a customer of
the railroads "to induce and compel the officials of railway companies to
give undue preference to draft gears and bumping" posts manufactured
and sold by . . . Iechanical Manufacturing Co.'"" Swift interests
owned 65 percent of common stock and around 87 percent of the prefer-
red stock of Mechanical. The Commission, just as in the Waugh case,
issued a cease and desist order on the theory that reciprocal buying had
been used by the respondents to coercively0 . suppress competition. How-
100. Id. at 247.
101. Federal Trade Con. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401 (1952).
102. 15 F.T.C. at 246-47.
103. There was more than a superfical similarity between the two cases. In 1929
Mechanical assigned its license to manufacture and sell cen;ering devices to Waugh.
Subsequently Mechanical, on two occasions, notified its customers "that it would be
satisfactory for said customres to purchase Waugh draft gears in place of Durable draft
gears." 16 F.T.C. at 74.
104. Id. at 72.
105. The coercion consisted of making known to railroads, in personal interviews
and letters on Swift stationary, that Swift & Co. owned Mechanical and therefore
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ever, there are subtle distinctions between the two decisions. The find-
ings by the Commission do not indicate the degree to which comletition
was lessened in the affected industry by the activities of Swift and Co.
It was clearly established that reciprocal buying of an unconcealed nature
was utilized. Yet there was no clear cut statistical determination as to
the market alterations generated by the practice. Moreover, the Com-
mission refrained from allegations of monopolization. Hence, Mechanical
Manufacturing Co. represents a slight departure from the standards laid
down in the Waugh decision. Mechanical seems to stand for the proposi-
tion that it is an unfair method of competition for a firm to make de-
mands that business be conducted on a reciprocal basis when the threaten-
ing firm is fully capable of enforcing its demands and actually makes a
move in that direction. It is obvious that the ultimate effect that recip-
rocal buying has on the market must be considered, but it nevertheless
becomes secondary. In other words, it is not necessary to wait until the
effects of reciprocity appear in a discernible violation of some other
antitrust statute before Section 5 becomes applicable. The emphasis of
the Commission's investigation in the Mechanical case was on coercive
conduct and the capacity of the firm to make good its threats. However,
it should be pointed out that in all three cases (Waugh, Mechanical and
California Packing Co.) the affected competitors of the firm being aided
by reciprocity were unable to retaliate. They did not have connections
with companies capable of exerting influential purchasing power nor did
they possess this power on their own. Thus, the question arises as to
whether the Commission would issue cease and desist orders if reciprocal
buying retaliation were possible? On principle the answer should be yes.
The fact that price, quality and service are subjugated, via coercive
tactics, to purchasing power is sufficient in itself to constitute a violation
of Section 5-regardless of what competitors do or can do.'
"Swift interests 'expected their railroad friends' or 'carriers that they patronized
liberally' to buy said products on a 'reciprocity' basis or to 'reciprocate' by buying a
portion of their requirements of draft gears or bumping posts . . . and, also that . . .
the Swift interests were disappointed . . .with traffic officials who failed to get their
railroads to order said Durable bumping posts or draft gears in substantial numbers,
sometimes indicating the number which would be considered satisfactory. . . ." Id at 73.
106. A related question is whether a firm should be allowed to meet a competitor's
reciprocal trading tactics with reciprocity pressures of its own. In other words, is a
"good faith meeting of competitors' reciprocity" permissable? Although not touching
directly on this point the court, in U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(1965 Trade Cas.) § 71518 at 81283 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1965) noted that "A branch
of the defendant's argument . . . has been that reciprocity is a normal and expected
business practice without any aura of illegality surrounding it, Insofar as the generic
status of reciprocity is concerned, Consolidated Foods silences any argument of per se
legality. Though this § 1 charge is a matter of first impression, the novel aspects
concern the characterization and classification of the effects of reciprocity, not of its
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The final case in the trilogy, California Packing Corp., adds little to
the Commission's commentary on reciprocal trading and Section 5. How-
ever, it does provide an enlightening and revealing in3ight into the inher-
ently anti-competitive qualities of the practice. California Packing Corp-
oration, a large distributor of brand name food products, owned (through
the ownership of 84 percent of the common stock of an intermediary
company) Encinal Terminals-a company that was in the business of
providing wharfing and the necessary accoutrements for shipping. Cali-
fornia Packing used its substantial influence as a shipper to induce steam-
ship lines to route their traffic through the facilities of Encinal Terminals.
It also persuaded its suppliers of raw materials and other items that it
would be prudent if they also used Encinal Terminals. Not satisfied
with this unique double barreled reciprocity, California Packing forced
many of the steamship companies to whom it gave traffic "to disclose
the identity of consignees and receivers of shipments of freight cargo
carried by said steamship companies . . ."" so that any supplier who
was not using Encinal Terminals could be brought back in line.
Based on the three decisions discussed above, the Federal Trade
Commission appears to be committed to the position that it is an unfair
method of competition for a firm to capitalize on tli e possession of sub-
stantial buying power by expressly threatening to withdraw or divert
business from suppliers unless they reciprocate purchases. It has been
conscious and manifest threats of economic reprisal that have caught the
Commission's attention. But economic intimidations are easily disguis-
able. What about the situation where the purchasing agent merely ac-
companies the salesman on his visits to prospective customers who just
happen to be suppliers? Or consider the company that coordinates pur-
chasing and selling data within a Trade Relations Department. The
mere fact that a Trade Relations Department exists is sufficient evidence
to suppliers that a firm is vitally concerned with reciprocal buying. There
is, therefore, no need to use less sophisticated methods, such as verbaliza-
tions, to convey threats. The essential question is whether Section 5 is
sufficiently pliable to cover the more subdued and subtle techniques of
economic pressure and intimidation that can be used with great effective-
ness to engender reciprocal buying. It is extremely unlikely that the
Commission would issue, and the reviewing courts approve, cease and
desist orders in situations where a company unilaterally decides that,
price and quality aside, it is good business to develcp goodwill by recip-
rocating purchases with customers. However, in view of the broad
essential nature. The defendant cannot be heard here to deferd reciprocity in principle
as an economic reality with commensurate competitive value."
107. 25 F.T.C. at 397.
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principles underlying Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and the fact that it can be used to curb an analogous device (the tying
contract), it seems logical that its language should become applicable
whenever an examination of an industry reveals that pressure in an
identifiable form is being used to foster reciprocal buying.' The prob-
lem is to identify the pressure.
V. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
DOES IT PROHIBIT RECIPROCAL BUYING?
Is it possible for the substantive language of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act-which declares the illegality of "Every contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade"' 9 -to be interpreted so as to
prohibit reciprocal buying? The answer is yes. Consolidated Foods
furnishes support for such an interpretation by establishing that recip-
rocity "is one of the congeries of anti-competitive practices at which the
antitrust laws are aimed.""'  However, the precise means of curbing
this practice under Section 1 is still in a state of evolution. Perhaps the
most meaningful approach to the problem is to review a similarily anti-
competitive technique that has received Section 1 scrutiny. Such a tech-
nique is the tying contract.'
The Tie-In Analogy
A tying contract "may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase
that product from any other supplier.""' 2 The foundation of both the
tying contract and reciprocal trading is the capacity to exert economic
power so as to obtain a desired objective. In the former it is the posses-
sion of a protected right or a valuable product while in the latter situation
the power to influence comes from purchasing strength. The normal
selling determinants, price, quality, etc., are subordinated. The maximum
108. Statements by the Federal Trade Commission in the Consolidated Foods case
indicate a commitment to this interpretation. Consolidated Foods Corp., Dkt. 7000,
Trade Reg. Rep. 1 16182 at 20978 (Transfer Binder 1961-63).
109. 26 STAT. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
110. 380 U.S. at 594.
111. The tie-in arrangement is expressly prohibited by § 3 of the Clayton Act. See,
e.g., International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; International Business Machines
Corp. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Machinery Co. v. U.S., 258 U.S. 451
(1922). See generally, DRLAm & KAHN, FAr COmPEITIONo: THE LAW AND EcoN0ics
or ANTITRUST POLIcY 97-119 (1954); James, Use of Patents to Control Unpatented
Materials, 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 427 (1946); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of
Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 HAiv. L. Rmv. 913 (1952).
112. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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effect of both techniques is to foreclose a portion of the market to com-
petitors. (Absolute foreclosure can result from the tying arrangement
while it is only probable that reciprocal buying pressure will foreclose.)
The minimum effect of both is to create "a priority on the business at
equal prices.""' These similarities support the argument that reciprocity
should receive the same treatment under Section 1 as the tying contract.
It is well established that there is a virtual per se violation of Section
1 when a seller is able to exert sufficient economic power in the market
for the tying product and the volume of business restrained in the market
for the tied product "cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial
M". A translation of these requisites to the reciprocity situation
would mean that the practitioner must possess substantial purchasing
power and the reciprocated purchases must be of such volume that the
foreclosure in that market is not insignificant or insubstantial. The first
element-defining the quantitive dimensions of substantial purchasing
power that must be exercised by the practitioner-has thus far been
crucial to any attack on reciprocal trading no matter what statute is used.
What "substantial" means in this context has not yet been reduced to
authoritative standards. The second element raises even a more serious
uncertainty. Are the tying contract definitions of "not insubstantial"
applicable to reciprocity? It will be remembered that unlike the tie-in
situation, where foreclosure is definite, reciprocal buying may or may
not preclude competitors from access to a market. It will not if the
supplier is sufficiently independent or economically powerful enough to
withstand pressure." 5  Moreover, competitors may be able to retaliate
effectively against reciprocal buying whereas once the tying contract is
effected reaction is impossible. What this means is that a higher level
of foreclosure should, and no doubt will, be required if the prevention of
reciprocity is to be predicated upon a tying arrangement analogy.
Proof of "Contract, Combination . . . or Conspiracy'"
The General Dynamics" case is pertinent or this point. After
merging with Liquid Carbonic Corp. in 1957 General Dynamics establish-
ed a Special Sales Program, which in reality was nothing more than a
Trade Relations Department. The purpose of the Program was to single
out and direct intensified sales pressure toward those firms who were on
a supplier-customer relationship with General Dynarmics and its acquired
113. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947).
114. Timcs-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 608-119 (1952).
115. This was, of course, Justice Stewart's argument in the Consolidated Foods
case. 380 U.S. at 607-08.
116. U.S. v. General Dynamics, 5 TRaDE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) fi 71518
(S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1965).
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firm. In calling on customers the Purchasing Agent was often by-passed
in favor of higher placed executives who would presumably be more
sensitive to reciprocal trading pressures.1 7 This type of activity prompted
the trial court, in denying General Dynamics' motion to dismiss, to note
that the existence and the discernible functioning of a Trade Relations
Department went a long way towards satisfying the level of proof neces-
sary to establish the presence of that "Contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy" which Section 1 requires. This is reflected in the following
comment:
The documents in evidence lead to the altogether reason-
able conclusion that reciprocity considerations were injected into
sales discussion and that the intent was to rise above the normal
considerations of competition by exercising the leverage which
existed. The clear inference to be drawn is that the sales agree-
ments resulting from these discussions contained implied recip-
rocity considerations. These agreements which emerge from
a course of conduct clearly declared anti-competitive are sus-
pect themselves because of the circumstances which surround
them, though no express condition is evident on the face of the
agreement. (Emphasis supplied.) 1 1 8
Not every firm that practices reciprocity utilizes the Trade Relations
Department concept. And the increasing glare of court attention pres-
ently being given reciprocal trading makes it unlikely that firms would
take a chance on inviting scrutiny by exhibiting such an obvious mani-
festation of intention. In other words, clear cut proof that reciprocity
is the controlling ingredient in sales agreements will become increasingly
difficult to establish. Hence, the decisive question is what does Section
1 require as indicia that reciprocity is the core of the arrangement? The
answer could possibly depend on three related factors: 1. the volume of
trade exchange between the accused and its suppliers, 2. a price, quality
and service comparison between the products of the practitioner and
those of his competitor, 3. the closeness of the courts' analogy between
per se anti-competitive practices such as the tie-in and reciprocal buying.
The larger the volume of trade exchange, a product comparison unfavor-
able to the accused, and the closer the analogy, the less evidence is needed
to show "that reciprocity considerations were injected in sales discus-
117. "The inference is clear that to by-pass the purchasing agent-seemingly
solely concerned with price, quality and service-and to go above his head, was
designed to accentuate an element the purchasing agent either could not, would not,
or was not able to appreciate-the existence of the supplier-customer relationship and
the advantage of reciprocal trading." Id. at 81281.
118. Id. at 81284.
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sions" 1 and hence became a foundation of the transaction.
The necessary essentials for the efficacious use of Section 1120 against
reciprocal trading are proof that sales agreements were precipitated by
purchasing power leverage and that the relationship effected through the
leverage resulted in market foreclosure. The level of the foreclosure
requirement should not be inflexible. When customer-suppliers are suf-
ficiently independent so that their purchases may not be the result of
pressure, the level should be higher than when such conditions do not
exist. Likewise, the degree of foreclosure should be greater, for reasons
previously stated, than the "not insubstantial" requirement necessary for
the tying contract. Of course, the main probleir is in proving the
existence of reciprocal buying leverage. This is the eternal problem of
reciprocity.
VI. CONCLUSION
That the effect of reciprocal trading is to clog the arteries of com-
petition is beyond dispute. The primary purpose of the practice is to
make inoperative those factors that have traditionally preserved com-
petition. The advantages flow only to the practitioner. The gain to the
firms who submit to reciprocity pressures is both ephemeral and illusory.
It is specious reasoning to justify acquiescence on the theory that it
develops sales and promotes goodwill. Any time a firm abdicates price,
quality and service as the controlling elements of its purchasing policy,
119. Ibid.
120. § 2 of the Sherman Act likewise applies to reciprt cal trading. In U.S. v.
National City Lines, 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951), five bus .quipment manufacturers
(including General Motors) purchased stock in City Lines at prices in excess of pre-
vailing market quotations. City Lines used the excess cash to expand its operations by
buying interest in various public transportation systems locateI throughout the United
States. In exchange for the stock purchases City Lines agreed to buy all future supplies
required by the transportation systems from the manufacturers. The court concluded
that competing suppliers would be "completely eliminated and the business of supplying
busses, tubes, tires to the public transportation system of the 45 cities is entirely in the
hands of the suppliers-in other words, monopolization by them." U.S. v. National City
Lines, supra at 567. § 2's somewhat higher standards of application will undoubtedly
mean that it will be used only in those instances where the effects of reciprocal trading
have reached the terminal stage. In the Government's pendin, action against General
Motors, U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 61-Cr-356, N.D. Ill. (indictment), the Department
of Justice has charged, at 12-13:
"21. General Motors has exercised the monopoly it unlawfully acquired
and maintains in the following ways, among others:
(b) By giving preference in routing traffic to railroads which purchase
General Motors' railroad locomotives with the purpose o- effect of inducing
purchases of railroad locomotives from General Motors.
(c) By using . . . General Motors' freight shipmcnts when attempting
to sell railroad locomotives with the purpose or effect of inducing actual or
potential customers to purchase all or a large portion of their railroad locomo-
tives from General Motors."
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it has mortgaged its future capacity to compete. Finally, evidence seems
to indicate that the practice is prevalent enough to merit concern. Hence
the arguments for prohibiting reciprocal buying are overwhelming. The
question is--can this be accomplished under existing statutes?
The demonstratable and intentional use of reciprocal trading is sus-
ceptible to successful trade regulation attack. The particular situation
under review will, of course, determine the statute that is applicable.
This is not to say that problems of amplification and interpretation do
not exist. Some of these difficulties have been discussed in previous
paragraphs. Nevertheless, a trend of applying existing legislation to
reciprocity, given impetus by the Consolidated Foods case, is in motion.
Judicial guidelines, admittedly fragmentary, are appearing. The coherent
development of these guidelines must await the substance of additional
decisions. This means that until a decision appears that conclusively
reverses the present trend or establishes restrictive boundaries on the
application of current laws, remedial legislation is not needed.
Present laws can be used to dissipate the influence of Trade Rela-
tion Departments and to erase conscious efforts at reciprocal trading.
However, the perplexing problem of intangible or what one commentator
calls "psychological"'' reciprocity remains. The presence of substantial
purchasing power resulting in a unilateral decision to buy from the source
of this power is beyond the pale of any statute currently in force. It is
doubtful if this situation can or should be changed.
121. Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTI-
TRUST BU-L. 93, 98-99 (1964).
